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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
GREGORY R. WIGHT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a criminal 
action filed within 30 days of the date of entry of the motion 
for new trial filed within ten days of sentencing of the defen-
dant. Because the defendant was convicted of a third degree 
felony, automobile homicide, jurisdiction is conferred on this 
court pursuant to §78-2a-3, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS i 
This is a direct appeal in a criminal case from a 
sentence and commitment of appellant to the Utah State Prison 
after a finding of guilt to the lesser-included offense of 
automobile homicide, a third degree felony under §76-5-207 (1) (a) , 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. The defendant was denied a fair trial and the 
conviction should be reversed because the Court did not enter 
Case No. 870558-CA 
(Priority No. ) 
2 
any f i n d i n g s in denying the motion to l i m i t the p rosecu t ion from 
cross-examining the defendant as to h i s 1977 robbery c o n v i c t i o n , 
2 . The Cour t e r r e d in not . d e c l a r i n g a m i s t r i a l when 
a ju ro r ind ica ted he knew the v i c t i m ' s family . 
3 . The C o u r t e r r e d in a d m i t t i n g e x p e r t t e s t i m o n y 
concerning acc iden t r e c o n s t r u c t i o n . 
4 . The Court should o r d e r a new t r i a l on the grounds 
t h a t the d e f e n d a n t ' s blood t e s t was i n t r o d u c e d i n t o e v i d e n c e 
w i t h o u t s u f f i c i e n t foundation and was not adminis tered according 
to s tandard medical p r a c t i c e . 
5 . The d e f e n d a n t was den ied e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of 
c o u n s e l d u r i n g t h e c o u r s e of t he t r i a l as s u p p o r t e d by the 
t e s t i m o n y i n t r o d u c e d in t he p o s t - c o n v i c t i o n m a t t e r of Gregory 
R. Wight v . Gera ld Cook, f i l e d in t he Thi rd J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t 
Cour t , Case No. C87-2157, in t h a t h i s counsel did not e f f e c t i v e l y 
r ep resen t the defendant . 
a. In f a i l i n g to t imely f i l e an appea l . 
b . In not be ing a d e q u a t e l y p r e p a r e d for t r i a l 
as demonstrated by the t r a n s c r i p t of the t r i a l (T. 9) . 
c . In not ob jec t ing to the ju ro r a f t e r the ju ro r 
had s t a t e d t h a t he knew the deceased v i c t i m ' s wife or expla in ing 
t o t h e d e f e n d a n t t h e c o n s e q u e n c e s of n o t making such an 
o b j e c t i o n . 
d . Not p r o p e r l y o b j e c t i n g t o t h e c h a i n of 
evidence concerning the blood t e s t s . 
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e. Not examining the witnesses about an accident 
reconstruction by the experts employed by the State of Utah 
concerning plaintiff's exhibit no. 1 which was prepared prior 
to the accident reconstruction exhibit introduced at trial and 
which indicated that the collision may have taken place at a 
different location on the roadway which would have been 
exculpatory to the defendant. I 
f. In allowing the expert medical examiner to 
testify as to facts not in evidence (T. 267). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Article I, Section 12, states that, "In criminal 
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel ... ". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
The defendant-appellant was charged in an information 
with the offense of automobile homicide, a second degree felony, 
and was convicted of the lesser included offense of automobile 
homicide, a third degree felony, by jury trial. 
B. Course of Proceeding. J 
After the jury found the defendant-appellant guilty, 
he was sentenced on July 8, 1986, to a third degree felony. 
A notice of appeal was not filed within thirty days. 
The defendant-appellant petitioned the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County in the case of Gregory Wight 
v^__G££jLL!_CoOJ< , Civil No. C87-2157. On September 14, 1987, 
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a f t e r a h e a r i n g he ld on J u l y 2 3 , 1987 , t he Honorable Frank G. 
Noel e n t e r e d an o r d e r t h a t the de fendan t - appe l l an t was e n t i t l e d 
t o be r e sen tenced based upon a f inding t h a t Mr. Wight was denied 
h i s r i g h t t o e f f e c t i v e a s s i s t a n c e of counsel for f a i l u r e to f i l e 
a n o t i c e of a p p e a l . J u d g e Noel h e l d t h a t u n d e r S t a t e v . 
J o h n s o n , 635 P.2d 36 (Utah , 1 9 8 0 ) , t he d e f e n d a n t was e n t i t l e d 
to be r e sen tenced . 
On O c t o b e r 6 , 1 9 8 7 , t h e d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t was 
r e s e n t e n c e d by t h e H o n o r a b l e Douglas Cornaby of the Second 
J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t Cour t . The de fendan t - appe l l an t f i l ed a motion 
for new t r i a l w i t h i n t en d a y s . The mot ion for new t r i a l was 
d e n i e d in a r u l i n g on November 20 , 1987 . The d e f e n d a n t then 
f i l e d a no t i ce of appea l . 
C. Disposition at Trial Court. 
The defendant was resentenced to the Utah State Prison 
for the conviction entered after the jury verdict effective as 
of July 8, 1986. 
D. Relevant Facts. 
On Thursday, June 12, 1986, and Friday, June 13, 1986, 
this case was presented to a jury in Farmington, Utah. Prior 
to trial the defendant-appellant's counsel made a motion to limit 
the State from introducing evidence of the defendant's prior 
felony conviction (T. 2). 
The evidence proffered to the Court indicated the 
defendant was convicted of robbery on February 18, 1977, and 
subsequently paroled in 1980. The Court denied the motion prior 
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t o commencement of t he t r i a l upon c o u n s e l ' s r e q u e s t t o b r i n g 
i t f i r s t to the j u r y ' s a t t e n t i o n d u r i n g opening a rguments in 
l i g h t of the Cour t ' s ru l ing (T. 6 ) . 
The f i r s t w i t n e s s / V i c t o r P e a r c e , t e s t i f i e d he was 
d r i v i n g nor thbound on Redwood Road on November 17, 1985, a t 1 
a .m. (T. 2 2 ) . J u s t p a s t the 1-215 o v e r p a s s a southbound ca r 
swerved in to h i s lane (T. 24) . He said the veh ic l e was t r a v e l i n g 
a t 55 miles per hour (T. 2 6 ) . After the car passed , i t continued 
down the road and Mr. p e a r c e t e s t i f i e d he saw a f lash of l i g h t 
and n o t i c e d he could not see the t a i l l i g h t s of t he ca r t h a t 
swerved in to h i s lane (T. 26 ) . 
The w i t n e s s i n d i c a t e d he t u r n e d h i s v e h i c l e around 
and d i s c o v e r e d t h e r e had been a head-on c o l l i s i o n (T. 27) . He 
s t a t e d t h a t he obse rved a d r ive r in each veh ic l e and one of the 
d r i v e r s Reid N ie l son appeared to be dead. The witness said the 
roads were dry and the re was no problem with v i s i b i l i t y (T. 32) . 
On c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n he s t a t ed t h a t i t took the paramedics four 
to f i v e hours t o e x t r i c a t e the defendan t from behind the wheel 
of h i s v e h i c l e (T. 4 4 ) . He s a id he d id not smel l any a lcohol 
on d e f e n d a n t ' s b r e a t h b u t d i d s e e some empty beer cans in 
de fendan t ' s veh ic le (T. 51) . 
The nex t w i t n e s s was David L. Barnes who was employed 
a t P a c i f i c Intermountain Express ( P . I . E . ) and was the supervisor 
of the d e c e a s e d , Reid N e i l s e n . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he saw Mr. 
N i e l s e n when he l e f t t h e t r u c k t e r m i n a l a t about 1:15 p .m. 
immediately before the acc ident (T. 63 ) . 
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The next witness, Rick Millen, was an acquaintance 
of the defendant and was working with the defendant on the 
evening of Saturday, November 16, 1985 (T. 67). He testified 
that on the evening before the accident he was working with the 
defendant on the defendant's car (T. 68). They were working 
on vehicles together at the shop at their place of employment 
from about 10 a.m. on the 16th of November until 1:30 in the 
morning on the 17th of November (T. 70). He purchased a 12-pack 
of 12-ounce beer and the defendant bought a 12-pack of 12-ounce 
beer (T. 71). He said he could not recall how much beer the 
defendant consumed but said the defendant was very tired when 
he had left at 1:30 a.m. after having worked all day on the 
vehicle. He said that he came across the scene of the accident 
on his way home and told the officers the defendant had "probably 
just fell asleep" (T. 82). He also said that he told the 
officers that Mr. Wight was not drunk when he left the shop 
immediately before the collision. 
A paramedic who responded to the scene of the accident 
testified that he inserted 1,000 "c.c.'s" of intravenous solution 
into the defendant's arm while he was trapped behind the wheel 
of his car before being extricated (T. 103). The paramedic 
testified on cross-examination that he did not perceive any smell 
of alcoholic beverage on the defendant's breath during the period 
of time he was attending the defendant at the accident scene 
or while he was being transported to the hospital (T. 107). 
Utah Highway Patrol Trooper Steven R. Bytheway 
testified that he contacted the defendant after he had been 
transported to the emergency room at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake 
Cityf Utah (T. 135). He said he placed the defendant under 
arrest while the defendant was unconscious and directed the 
technician to draw blood from the defendant's arm (T. 146). 
The officer testified that he arrived on the scene at about 1:50 
a.m. and the blood was drawn from the defendant's arm at 3:30 
a.m. (T. 146) . 
Kathy Burns, the technician, testified that after 
drawing the blood, she took the packet home and kept the sample 
in her refrigerator (T. 152). On November 21, 1985, she took 
the sample to the State Laboratory for analysis. 
Bruce Beck, an expert toxicologist for the State Health 
Laboratory, testified that the chemical analysis of the 
defendant's blood indicated a blood alcohol level of .20 percent 
weight to volume (T. 285) . He testified that the exhibit which 
he analyzed, Exhibit No. 12, had writing on it stating "B.A. 
5/2/85" and that nB.A.M meant blood alcohol (T. 293). He could 
not explain the reason why the exhibit stated it was for blood 
alcohol taken in May, six months prior to the accident (T. 293) . 
He further stated that it would be possible for a person to not 
have been above the legal limit when driving if the person 
consumed sufficient quantities of alcohol just prior to driving 
(T. 295). The blood was taken in this case over two hours after 
the driving (12:50 to 3:30) and was recejived without testimony 
as t o r e l a t i o n back t o the t ime of d r i v i n g or o b j e c t i o n from 
defense counsel (T. 285) . 
The d e f e n d a n t took the s t a n d and t e s t i f i e d (T. 306) . 
Mr. Wight s t a t e d t h a t he worked a t Companion Systems as a p a i n t e r 
t h e week b e f o r e t h e a u t o a c c i d e n t ( T . 3 0 7 ) . On S a t u r d a y , 
November 16 f 1985 , he went t o h i s p l a c e of employment a t 700 
West Redwood Road, North S a l t Lake , Utah ( 5 . 311) . He said he 
worked on p e r s o n a l v e h i c l e s a t h i s bus iness premises from about 
12 noon on S a t u r d a y , November 16 , 1985 , wi th Rick M i l l e n (T. 
3 2 0 ) . Mr. Wight t e s t i f i e d in d e t a i l concerning h i s a c t i v i t y on 
t h e day b e f o r e the a c c i d e n t and d e s c r i b e d h i s consumpt ion of 
a l c o h o l . He t e s t i f i e d t h a t he drank the m a j o r i t y of the beer 
t h a t he consumed a f t e r midnight on the morning of November 17th 
and p r io r to leaving a t approximately 1 a.m. (T. 336) . 
Mr. Wight t e s t i f i e d t h a t he was extremely t i r e d while 
d r i v i n g h i s ca r (T. 3 3 9 ) . He r e c a l l e d veer ing to the r i g h t and 
in r e l a t i o n to the acc ident s t a t e d as fo l lows : 
A I d o n ' t know how far I was over t he 
l i n e . I d o n ' t remember ever being t h i s far 
over and to the shoulder or near the shoulder 
o f t h e r o a d . What I r e m e m b e r when I 
i n i t i a l l y j u s t remembered and what I remem-
b e r e d a f t e r w a r d s , s a y , t h i s i s t h e t r u c k 
h e r e . This h e a d l i g h t he re was h i t t i n g me 
r i g h t in t he e y e s , s t r a i g h t i n t o the eyes , 
b l i n d i n g me a l m o s t and I was s e v e r a l ca r 
l e n g t h s , a t l e a s t , back from t h a t and I 
c o u l d n ' t f i g u r e out why, during t h a t period 
of t i m e , t h e r e was no movement going e i t h e r 
d i r e c t i o n because for some r ea son I gues s 
I assumed t h a t I was comple te ly in my l a n e , 
but then when I r e a l i z e d t h i s veh ic l e wasn ' t 
g o i n g t o move t o t h e s i d e , I vee red hard 
t o my r i g h t and I b e l i e v e I punched the 
a c c e l e r a t o r t o t a l l y to the f l o o r . 
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(T. 340) 
Q Why did you do that? 
A To gam some speed because it was coming 
up so fast or it seemed to be, but I don't 
remember ever being that far over and I was 
conscious, and if I had been way over here, 
this headlight wouldn't have been staring 
me straight in the eyes. That's how my 
recollection is and that's how I remember 
it as clearly as I can recall. Then that 
was the end of it. That's all I remember 
until just a little while later. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. A new trial should be granted [because the appellant 
was denied a fair trial when the court denied the motion to limit 
evidence of his 1977 robbery conviction and he was required to 
answer to a felony conviction when he took the stand. 
2. The court should grant a new trial based upon bias 
of a juror not disclosed on voir dire and discovered after the 
jury was impaneled. j 
3. Because the defendant was not lawfully arrested 
and no foundation existed for admission of the blood sample or 
results of testing of the sample, the blood sample, exhibit 12, 
should have been excluded from evidence. j 
4. The court erred in admitting the expert opinion 
concerning the speed of the defendant's vehicle. 
5. The record of the trial and the post-conviction 
hearing held in Wight v. Cook supports a finding of ineffective 
assistance of counsel which requires a new trial. 
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ARGUMENT 
I 
A NEW TRIAL SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE 
APPELLANT WAS DENIED A FAIR TRIAL WHEN THE 
COURT DENIED THE MOTION TO LIMIT EVIDENCE 
OF HIS 1977 ROBBERY CONVICTION AND HE WAS 
REQUIRED TO ANSWER TO A FELONY CONVICTION 
WHEN HE TOOK THE STAND. 
The defendant filed a motion prior to trial to limit 
evidence of a prior conviction (T. 2) • The Court heard argument 
prior to impaneling the jury that Mr. Wight was convicted of 
aggravated robbery in February 1977 and was paroled from the 
Utah State Prison in 1980 for that offense. 
The issue involved is whether the prior offense 
involved "dishonesty or false statement" and whether the 
conviction could have been used by the prosecution to attack 
the victim's credibility. Rule 609(a), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The prosecution argued that the offense involved theft 
of the property of another and was therefore an offense obviously 
involving dishonesty. In the memorandum filed in the lower 
court, the State cited the case of State v. Clinton, 680 P.2d 
33 (Utah, 1984). However, that case is distinguishable because 
it involves a prior conviction of theft, not robbery. Clinton 
was decided under Rule 21 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, not 
Rule 609 as invoked in this case before the Court. 
The definition of aggravated robbery applicable in 
1977 under §76-6-301, U.C.A., was as follows: 
Robbery is the unlawful and intentional 
taking of personal property of another from 
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h i s p e r s o n , or immediate p r e s e n c e , a g a i n s t 
h i s w i l l , a c c o m p l i s h e d by means of f o r c e 
or f e a r , us ing a f i r e a r m or causing s e r i ous 
bodi ly i n j u r y . (Emphasis added.) | 
In t h e r e c e n t c a s e of S t a t e v . S a n i v i l l e , 64 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 17 (Augus t , 1987) / the Supreme Court i n d i c a t e d t h a t 
the gravamen of the offense of robbery i s the t h r e a t of phys ica l 
f o r c e . The cr ime of r o b b e r y does n o t , by i t s n a t u r e , involve 
any d i s h o n e s t s t a t e m e n t and i s based upon the use of fo r ce 
s i m i l a r t o an a s s a u l t i n s t e a d of the d e c e p t i o n invo lved in a 
fraud or p e r j u r y . I 
In S t a t e v . Banner , 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah , 1 9 8 6 ) , the 
S u p r e m e C o u r t i n d i c a t e d t h a t c r i m e s such a s r a p e do n o t 
i n h e r e n t l y r e f l e c t on the d e f e n d a n t ' s c h a r a c t e r for t r u t h and 
v e r a c i t y . The Court recognized t h a t any s e r i ous felony involves 
moral t u r p i t u d e but d id not e q u a t e l ack of moral t u rp i t ude to 
inherent d i shones ty . 
The Utah Supreme Court has not r u l e d as to whether 
t h e o f f e n s e of robbe ry c o n s t i t u t e s a cr ime of " d i s h o n e s t y . " 
However, t he f e d e r a l c a s e s i n t e r p r e t i n g Rule 609 of the Federal 
R u l e s of E v i d e n c e have n o t un i fo rmly a c c e p t e d a l l o f f e n s e s 
i n v o l v i n g robbe ry as a u t o m a t i c a l l y admiss ib le under Subsection 
(2) of Rule 609 . For example , in Uni ted S t a t e s v . Glen , 667 
F.2d 1269 ( C a l . , 1982), the Court s a i d : i 
G e n e r a l l y , crimes of v i o l e n c e , t h e f t c r imes , 
and c r i m e s of s t e a l t h do n o t i n v o l v e 
" d i s h o n e s t y or f a l se s ta tement" and are thus 
not a u t o m a t i c a l l y a d m i s s i b l e to impeach the 
c r e d i b i l i t y of a w i t n e s s ; a l t h o u g h such 
c r i m e s may i n d i c a t e a l a ck of r e s p e c t for 
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t he p e r s o n s or p r o p e r t y of o t h e r s , they do 
n o t b e a r d i r e c t l y on the l i k e l i h o o d t h a t 
the wi tness w i l l t e s t i f y t r u t h f u l l y ; however, 
a c o n v i c t i o n fo r b u r g l a r y or t h e f t may 
n e v e r t h e l e s s be a d m i s s i b l e under t h i s r u l e 
i f t h e c r i m e was a c t u a l l y c o m m i t t e d by 
f raudulent or d e c e i t f u l means. 
See a l s o , Uni ted S t a t e s v . O r t e g a , 561 F.2d 803 ( A r i z . , 1977) , 
where the Court s t a t e d : 
Within subd. (a)(2) of t h i s r u l e , "d i shones ty 
or f a l s e s t a t e m e n t " i s l i m i t e d t o t h o s e 
crimes t h a t involve some element of mi s rep re -
s e n t a t i o n or o t h e r i n d i c i u m of p r o p e n s i t y 
to l i e . 
See Government of V i r g i n I s l a n d s v . T o t o , 529 F.2d 278 ( 1 s t 
C i r . , 1976) . 
In United States v. Smith, 551 F.2d 348 (1st Cir., 
1976), the Court ruled attempted robbery was not a crime 
involving false statement within Rule 609(a)(2) and was not 
automatically admissible. See also, United States v. Seamster, 
568 F.2d 188 (10th Cir., 1978) (burglary not automatically 
admissible) ; and United States v. Entrekin, 624 F.2d 597 (3rd 
Cir., 1980) (shoplifting not automatically admissible). 
In this case the trial court did not clearly state 
whether its ruling allowing the conviction into evidence was 
based upon Rule 609(a)(1) or (2). Judge Cornaby stated, "I think 
one has the right to evaluate. . .his past as part of it. . . . 
It's within the period of time, so I am going to so rule." (T. 
6) . 
The basis stated by the Court would not be a sufficient 
finding under Rule 609(a)(1) as stated by the recent Supreme 
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C o u r t d e c i s i o n s in SMt a. J: £_ Z-i—^£ H H ££ ' s u p r a , and _S _t a. _t £_ .v _L 
G e n t r y , 71 Utah Adv.Rep. 20 ( 1 2 - 1 - 8 7 ) . 3Jn c a s e s under 609(a) 
t h e Supreme C o u r t has r u l e d t h a t the Court must a t t e m p t to 
b a l a n c e the p r e j u d i c i a l e f f e c t a g a i n s t the p roba t ive value and 
has i d e n t i f i e d the following f a c t o r s : j 
1 . The n a t u r e of t h e c r i m e , a s b e a r i n g on t h e 
cha rac te r for v e r a c i t y of the w i t n e s s . 
2 . The r e c e n t n e s s o r r e m o t e n e s s of t h e p r i o r 
c o n v i c t i o n . | 
3 . The s i m i l a r i t y of t he p r i o r cr ime to the charged 
c r ime , insofar as a c lose resemblance may lead the ju ry to punish 
the accused as a bad person . | 
4 . The importance of c r e d i b i l i t y i s sues in determining 
the t r u t h in a p rosecut ion t r i e d without d e c i s i v e nontes t imonia l 
ev idence . I 
5 . The i m p o r t a n c e of the a c c u s e d ' s t e s t i m o n y , as 
p e r h a p s w a r r a n t i n g the e x c l u s i o n of c o n v i c t i o n s p r o b a t i v e of 
the accused ' s cha rac t e r for v e r a c i t y . 
The 1977 r o b b e r y c o n v i c t i o n of t h e d e f e n d a n t i s 
o b v i o u s l y remote and could only have caused the ju ry to punish 
the accused as a bad p e r s o n , not to e v a l u a t e h i s c r e d i b i l i t y . 
There i s a reasonable l i ke l i hood t h a t the r e s u l t would have been 
d i f f e r e n t i f the Court excluded the de fendan t ' s p r io r convic t ion 
in t h a t the i s s u e of n e g l i g e n c e and c a u s a t i o n by consumpt ion 
of a l c o h o l were c r u c i a l i s s u e s r e s o l v e d on he b a s i s in pa r t of 
the de fendan t ' s tes t imony. I 
mmmmmmr 
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The prosecution failed to present any evidence about 
the specific facts of the prior conviction in order that the 
Court could determine whether the offense involved false 
statement in the commission or was simply a violent crime. 
Standing alone, this conviction for robbery is simply a crime 
of violence which does not involve false statement or a 
propensity to lie and should not have been admitted at trial. 
The error warrants several of the convictions for a 
new trial and on order that the conviction cannot be used on 
retrial. 
II 
THE COURT SHOULD GRANT A NEW TRIAL BASED 
UPON BIAS OF A JUROR NOT DISCLOSED ON VOIR 
DIRE AND DISCOVERED AFTER THE JURY WAS 
IMPANELED. 
A f t e r t h e j u r y was i m p a n e l e d and t h e p r o s e c u t i o n made 
i t s opening s t a t e m e n t t o t h e j u r y , t h e r e c o r d a t page 15 r e f l e c t s 
t h e f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e : 
THE COURT: Mr. Walsh . 
MR. WALSH: Could we a p p r o a c h t h e bench for 
a second? 
THE COURT: S u r e . 
( W h e r e u p o n , a d i s c u s s i o n was h e l d o f f t h e 
r e c o r d between t h e Cour t and c o u n s e l . ) 
THE COURT: Does a n y b o d y know t h e p e r s o n 
who i s d e c e a s e d ? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT; Y e s . I d o n ' t know him 
p e r s o n a l l y . I know h i s w i f e . I d i d n o t 
c o n n e c t any of t h i s p r i o r t o h i s s t a t e m e n t 
up h e r e , b u t I do know h i s w i f e , b u t I do 
no t know him p e r s o n a l l y . 
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THE COURT: In what c a p a c i t y ? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: B e f o r e t h e y moved t o 
C e n t e r v i l l e , t h e y l i v e d a b o u t a b l o c k and 
a h a l f from u s . 
THE COURT: C l o s e l y a s s o c i a t e d wi th them? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: No. J u s t t h r o u g h t h e 
c h u r c h . 
THE COURT: B e l o n g e d t o t h e same ward? I s 
t h a t what you a r e s a y i n g ? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: Yes . 
THE COURT: You u n d e r s t a n d w h a t I s a i d 
e a r l i e r a b o u t t h e o b l i g a t i o n t o be f a i r and 
i m p a r t i a l j u r o r s . The f a c t t h a t you know 
t h e d e c e a s e d , would t h a t h a v e a n y t h i n g t o 
do wi th t h a t ? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: I d o n ' t k n o w . I t 
w o u l d n ' t . I 
THE COURT: You w i l l be f a i r and i m p a r t i a l ? 
JUROR LANE FAWCETT: A b s o l u t e l y . 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. WALSH: Your H o n o r , c o u n s e l , l a d i e s and 
gen t l emen of t he j u r y . 
(T. 16 and 17) . 
In the case of Gregory Wight v. Gerald Cook, Third 
District Court, Civil No. C87-2157, the Court ruled the defendant 
was denied effective assistance of counsel in relation to filing 
an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court. In that hearing, evidence 
was presented which bears on the issue of whether the defendant 
waived any objection to the juror in this case. A transcript 
of the hearing has been filed in relation to the hearing on the 
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motion for new t r i a l wi th the cour t in t h i s c a s e . The evidence 
of t h e s u b s e q u e n t t r i a l i s r e l e v a n t e v i d e n c e in c o n s i d e r i n g 
whether t o g r a n t a motion for new t r i a l on t he b a s i s of t h i s 
i s s u e t o d e t e r m i n e w h e t h e r the o b j e c t i o n was waived by t h e 
defendant . 
In that hearing the trial attorney for the defendant, 
John Walsh/ testified as follows concerning this matter: 
MR. WALSH: I approached the bench first 
and inquired of the judge the fact that we 
had not asked the panel of jurors whether 
or not they knew the decedent. He then said, 
"Very well. Go ahead and take your seats 
and I will inquire." And then he proceeded 
to inquire of the jurors whether or not any 
of them knew the decedent. 
Q (By Mr. Gaither) Have you had a chance 
to review the transcript, sir? 
A No, I haven't. 
Q Show you the t r a n s c r i p t of the t r i a l . . 
A I t d o e s n ' t a p p e a r . I d o n ' t have an 
i n d i v i d u a l r e c o l l e c t i o n t h a t I approached 
him the second t ime . I may have j u s t s t a t e d 
i t from the bench. 
Q So any c o n v e r s a t i o n you had with Mr. 
Wight would have been held a t counsel t a b l e 
ins ide the courtroom? 
A Exac t ly . 
Q And you d i d n o t ask for a r e c e s s or 
any b r e a k to d i s c u s s t h i s m a t t e r wi th Mr. 
Wight? 
A The j u d g e g a v e us u l t i m a t e t i m e . 
Whether I asked him or no t , I d o n ' t r e c a l l . 
But t h e t h r u s t i s t h e judge gave me ample 
t i m e t o d i s c u s s i t wi th my c l i e n t s and we 
decided a t t h a t poin t in time— 
17 
Q And your t e s t i m o n y i s t h a t Mr. Wight 
was t o l d t h a t he c o u l d have an a u t o m a t i c 
m i s t r i a l if he would make an ob jec t ion? 
A T h a t ' s c o r r e c t . 
Q And your t e s t i m o n y i s t h a t he waived 
the r i g h t to make t h a t ob jec t ion? 
A He i n s t r u c t e d me not to o b j e d t . 
Q A l l r i g h t . What was the words t h a t 
he used when he s a i d t h a t , t o the b e s t of 
your r e c o l l e c t i o n ? I 
A He s a i d , " I d o n ' t want to s t a r t over 
and so l e t ' s j u s t p roceed as if nothing had 
happened ." 
(Transcr ip t in the case of Wight v . Cook, pages 48 to 50.) 
L a t e r , t h e d e f e n d a n t - a p p e l l a n t , Gregory R. Wight , 
t e s t i f i e d in the habeas corpus matter as fo l lows: 
Q You have h e a r d the t e s t i m o n y of Mr. 
Walsh c o n c e r n i n g d i s c u s s i o n s t h a t he had 
a b o u t t h e j u r o r who was l e f t on the t r i a l 
ju ry panel today, i s t h a t c o r r e c t , s i r ? 
A (MR. WIGHT) Yes. 
Q Did you ever instruct him not to object? 
A To the juror? 
Q Yes. 
A No. My r e c o l l e c t i o n i s t h a t t h e r e 
w a s n ' t any l o n g i n v o l v e d c o n v e r s a t i o n or 
d i s c u s s i o n . What i t was l i k e , we only have 
a v e r y s h o r t p e r i o d of t ime to d e c i d e i n . 
And I p r e t t y much t r i e d to leave everything 
up t o him in t e r m s of t h e d e c i s i o n and 
t h r o u g h o u t the c o u r s e of the t r i a l . I j u s t 
f e l t l i k e - - m a i n l y I t r i e d t o u n d e r s t a n d , 
you know, what t r a n s p i r e d a f t e r w a r d . And 
I c a n ' t r e c a l l exac t ly what the conversa t ions 
were or what my r e s p o n s e was, or what i s 
where. But i t wasn ' t cut and t r i e d as s a i d . 
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Q How long were these conversations? 
A They were very short. 
Q And did you ever leave the courtroom 
or take any— 
A No. 
Q —recess? 
A No. There was no r e c e s s . 
Q And t h e s e w e r e d i s c u s s i o n s i n t h e 
cour t room? 
A In t h e c o u r t r o o m , y e s . 
Q And d id he ever e x p l a i n t o you in d e t a i l 
w h a t r e m e d i e s y o u w o u l d h a v e o f t h e 
c o n s e q u e n c e s of o b j e c t i n g t o t h e j u r o r ? 
A I t h i n k - - w e l l , s e e t h e t h i n g was — I 
know he b r o u g h t up t h e f a c t or s o m e t h i n g 
a b o u t t h e m i s t r i a l . But i t w a s n ' t c l e a r 
t o me . H e - - I was u n d e r t h e i m p r e s s i o n a l s o 
p o s s i b l y t h a t j u r y c o u l d be r e p l a c e d w i t h 
a n o t h e r , you know, j u r o r , wi th t h e r ema in ing 
j u r o r s s t i l l b e i n g a l l o w e d t o be on t h e 
s t a n d . 
Now, t h a t would h a v e been u n p l e a s a n t 
t o me a t t h i s t i m e . I d i d n ' t t h i n k t h a t 
w o u l d h a v e b e e n a v e r y good move t o h a v e 
s o m e t h i n g l i k e t h a t t r a n s p i r e . I d i d n ' t 
know w h a t a l l c o u l d h a p p e n , you know. I 
d i d n ' t know what t h e o p t i o n s w e r e . I d i d 
n o t h a v e any c l e a r u n d e r s t a n d i n g abou t what 
t h e a c t i o n s w e r e and i t w a s - - The mos t 
e f f e c t i v e t h i n g w o u l d h a v e b e e n t o h a v e 
c a l l e d f o r a r e c e s s and we c o u l d h a v e gone 
o u t of t h e c o u r t r o o m and d i s c u s s e d i t i n 
d e t a i l , so t h a t I would have known, you know, 
w h a t r e a l l y w a s , you k n o w , t r a n s p i r i n g 
c o m p l e t e l y . 
My w i f e i s t h e one t h a t s a i d someth ing 
t o t h e e f f e c t of I d o n ' t know i f I can h a n d l e 
g o i n g t h r o u g h t h i s , you know, any l o n g e r , 
when he b r o u g h t t h a t u p . I d i d n ' t say t h a t . 
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That was my wife, that said something to 
that effect, i 
(Transcript, Wight v. Cook, pages 61 to 63) 
I n
 State v, Jones, 52 Utah Adv.Rep. 39 (1987), the 
Supreme Court ruled that a trial court committed prejudicial 
error in refusing to excuse two jurors for cause. In that case 
one juror had associated with the victim's sister-in-law at 
work. The second juror knew the family of the victim and had 
attended the victim's funeral. The Court held that both jurors 
should have been dismissed from the panel and that the juror's 
later statements upon questioning by the judge could not obviate 
the strong inference of bias. The Court then reversed the 
conviction for a new trial. I 
If a motion for mistrial had been held in this case, 
the Court would have had to grant such a motion. Since no motion 
was made, the Court can still correct this error prior to 
appeal. In the cases of State v. Cobo, 69 P. 2d 952 (Utah, 
1936); State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246 (Utah, 1970); and State 
v. Schoenfield, 545 P.2d 193 (Utah, 1976), the Supreme Court 
has held that errors can be noticed without objection if 
injustice has resulted. I 
In this case the Court should recognize the error 
without a finding of any waiver as a result of no objection. 
The Court has the benefit of the record of the recent writ of 
habeas corpus matter which reflects that the defendant did not 
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voluntarily waive the error and that according to the defendant, 
he was never fully explained the consequences. 
In light of the case of State v. Jones, supra, the 
Court should correct the injustice which took place at trial 
and award a new trial before an impartial jury. 
Ill 
BECAUSE THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT LAWFULLY 
ARRESTED AND NO FOUNDATION EXISTED FOR 
ADMISSION OF THE BLOOD SAMPLE OR RESULTS 
OF TESTING OF THE SAMPLE, THE BLOOD SAMPLE, 
EXHIBIT 1 2 , SHOULD HAVE BEEN EXCLUDED FROM 
EVIDENCE. 
The S t a t e ' s e x p e r t t o x i c o l o g i s t , B r u c e Beck of t h e 
Utah S t a t e H e a l t h L a b o r a t o r y , t e s t i f i e d he t e s t e d t h e blood found 
i n S t a t e ' s E x h i b i t 12 t h a t he r e c e i v e d from Ka thy B u r n s on 
November 2 1 , 1985 ( T . 2 8 1 ) . He s a i d he i n i t i a l e d t h e v i a l and 
p e r f o r m e d an a n a l y s i s on t h e same day he r e c e i v e d t h e v i a l (T. 
283) . 
C o u n s e l f o r t h e d e f e n d a n t d i d n o t o b j e c t t o E x h i b i t 
12 which was a d m i t t e d i n t o e v i d e n c e . However, c o u n s e l for t h e 
d e f e n d a n t l a t e r asked t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n s abou t E x h i b i t 12 : 
Q (By Mr . W a l s h on c r o s s - e x a m i n a t i o n ) 
Do y o u know w h a t a l l t h e m a r k s mean on 
E x h i b i t 12 as fa r as d a t e s and so f o r t h ? 
A I c a n g u e s s . I know what my own marks 
mean and o t h e r m a r k s I can make a s s u m p t i o n s 
a b o u t . 
Q Drawing y o u r a t t e n t i o n t o t h e b o t t o m 
of E x h i b i t 1 2 , you h a v e a "BA 5 - 2 - 8 5 " ; i s 
t h a t r i g h t ? 
A T h a t ' s what i t s ays t h e r e . 
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Q "BA" i s a t e r m used in t h e i n d u s t r y 
t o d e t e r m i n e b l o o d a l c o h o l c o n t e n t ; i s t h a t 
no t ? 
A Y e a h , Our a b b r e v i a t i o n , t o me , "BA" 
means blood a l c o h o l . 
Q Do you h a v e any k n o w l e d g e of where a 
"BA f o r May of l a s t y e a r would h a v e come 
on E x h i b i t 12? 
A No. 
L a t e r on r e d i r e c t e x a m i n a t i o n , t h e f o l l o w i n g q u e s t i o n 
was posed by t h e p r o s e c u t o r : 
Q (By Mr. Andrus ) R e f e r r i n g t o E x h i b i t 
1 2 , do you h a v e any i d e a w h e t h e r what Mr. 
W a l s h r e f e r r e d t o a s WBA 5 - 2 - 8 5 . " Do you 
know i f t h a t r e f e r s t o a d a t e or no t ? 
A No, I d o n f t . 
Q Do you know what it refers td? 
A No. 
In a d d i t i o n , t h e e v i d e n c e of t h e c h a i n of c u s t o d y of 
E x h i b i t 12 had shown t h a t t h e p e r s o n drawing t h e blood had kept 
t h e b l o o d i n her r e f r i g e r a t o r a t home in a locked c o n t a i n e r from 
November 1 7 , 1 9 8 5 , u n t i l s h e t o o k i t t o Mr. B r u c e Beck on 
November 2 1 , 1985 (T . 1 5 2 ) . She f u r t h e r t e s t i f i e d t h a t because 
s h e had a l o t of c o u r t c a s e s , s h e d i d n ' t h a v e t i m e t o g e t t he 
t u b e s t o t he l a b on Monday, bu t wa i t ed u n t i l Thursday (T. 1 5 5 ) . 
F u r t h e r m o r e , t h e e r r o r s c o n c e r n i n g a d m i s s i o n s a r e 
compounded b e c a u s e no o b j e c t i o n was made t h a t t h e e v i d e n c e d id 
n o t e s t a b l i s h t h e b l o o d was d r a w n w i t h i n two h o u r s of t h e 
d r i v i n g . The t e c h n i c i a n t e s t i f i e d t h a t she drew t h e blood from 
Mr . W i g h t a t 3 : 3 0 i n t h e m o r n i n g ( T . 1 5 0 ) . H o w e v e r , t h e 
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eyewitness, Victor M. Pearce, testified the accident was observed 
at about 1 a.m. or 12:45 a.m. (T. 23 and 33). Other times varied 
between 1 a.m. and 1:30 a.m. as the time of the accident. 
Finally, no motion to suppress was made based on the 
seizure of the blood and the fact that the defendant was arrested 
while still unconscious at the hospital (T. 135) . The officer 
testified that: 
A I waited for a few moments until the 
blood technician, Kathy Burns, arrived. 
Then she and I went into the emergency room 
together. The subject was unconscious at 
the time. I walked over to the subject. 
I could smell the odor of alcohol coming 
from his breath. I then formally placed 
him under arrest and then Kathy Burns drew 
the blood out of his arm. 
Q Was she under your direction? 
A Yes. 
The "arrest" in this case did not comply with the Utah 
statutes which required the arrested person to be informed of 
the officer's cause and authority to arrest as required by 
§77-7-6, U.C.A. (1953, as amended). The "arrest" did not comply 
with the Utah law concerning arrest procedures as required by 
§77-7-1, et seq., U.C.A. (1953, as amended). Therefore, under 
the recent case of In the Interest of I.R.L., 61 Utah Adv.Rep. 
48 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1987), his blood test was the result 
of an unconstitutional search and seizure. In that case the 
Court of Appeals held that the blood test must be taken after 
a lawful arrest to avoid suppression under the Fourth and 
Fourteenth Amendments. 
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In the case of In the i n t e r e s t of I .R .L , , supra , 
the Court of Appeals noted t h a t even though there was c lear ly 
probable cause to place the appe l l an t under a r r e s t , the person 
was not placed under a r r e s t . The Court noted that the suspected 
d r ive r was not informed of h i s r i g h t s and was not informed as 
to the consequences of refusal to submit to a blood t e s t . 
In the p r e s e n t c a s e , a l l of the f ac to r s recognized 
in the above-cited case are present . In addi t ion, the defendant 
could not have submitted because the officer t e s t i f i ed that he 
was unconscious at the time of the " a r r e s t " . 
In l i g h t of the foundational and cons t i tu t iona l error 
concerning the admission of the blood t e s t , the appellant should 
be awarded a new t r i a l . 
IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE EXPERT 
OPINION CONCERNING THE SPEED OF, THE DEFEN-
DANT'S VEHICLE. 
The Court allowed two Utah Highway Patrol troopers, 
Shrol Erickson and Robert Dahle, to testify over objection as 
to their expert opinion as to the speed of the defendant's 
vehicle (T. 202). Prior to this expert conclusion, Officer 
Erickson testified that he only had the following experience 
as an expert: 
A I n POST, w h i c h i s P e a c e O f f i c e r ' s 
S t a n d a r d of T r a i n i n g of p o l i c e Academy, I 
h a d a p p r o x i m a t e l y 80 h o u r s o f a c c i d e n t 
i n v e s t i g a t i o n , a t which t i m e , a p p r o x i m a t e l y 
a y e a r a f t e r t h a t I had ano the^ : 40 h o u r s 
of i n t e r m e d i a l a c c i d e n t i n v e s t i g a t i o n and 
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l a s t J a n u a r y I j u s t c o m p l e t e d a d v a n c e d 
acc iden t i n v e s t i g a t i o n , another 40 hour s , 
Q And t h a t l a s t c o u r s e o c c u r r e d a f t e r 
you i n v e s t i g a t e d t he a c c i d e n t t h a t i s t h e 
sub jec t of t h i s p a r t i c u l a r case? 
A That i s c o r r e c t . 
Q Have you i n v e s t i g a t e d , d u r i n g your 
p e r i o d a s a p o l i c e o f f i c e r , h a v e you 
i n v e s t i g a t e d t r a f f i c acc iden t s? 
A Yes, I have. 
Q How many accidents have you investi-
gated? 
A I would say upward towards 75, ballpark 
figure. 
(T. 173)• 
Later on voir d i r e , Officer Erickson s t a t e d in response 
t o q u e s t i o n s from d e f e n s e c o u n s e l a d d i t i o n a l i n f o r m a t i o n 
concerning h i s exper i ence : 
Q (By Mr. Walsh) I s n ' t i t c o r r e c t , 
O f f i c e r , t h a t you have never t e s t i f i e d in 
c o u r t r e g a r d i n g c r i t i c a l speed scuff before 
t h i s case? 
A T h a t ' s t r u e . 
Q And i s n ' t i t a l s o t r u e , O f f i c e r , t h a t 
o v e r t h e e n t i r e t i m e t h a t you worked for 
t h e p o l i c e depar tment , you only had ten such 
acc iden t s as t h i s ? 
A I d o n ' t r e c a l l . I d o n ' t keep e x a c t 
count of s p e c i f i c types of a c c i d e n t s . 
Q Do you r e c a l l t he p r e l i m i n a r y hear ing 
took p l a c e when Judge Johnson asked you how 
many s i m i l a r type c a s e s as t h i s you handled 
and you said ten a t most, t e n . 
A Okay. I can go along with t h a t . 
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Q Is t h a t t rue? 
A Sure . 
L a t e r he t e s t i f i e d t h a t in e s t i m a t i n g the speed of 
the veh ic l e s involved in t h i s head-on c o l l i s i o n , Officer Erickson 
r e l i e d upon c h a r t s from t h e N o r t h w e s t e r n I n s t i t u t e * Upon 
ques t ioning by the p ro secu to r , he s t a t e d : 
A W e l l , t h e t r a f f i c - - o r t h e T r a f f i c 
I n s t i t u t e i n s t i g a t e d by the N o r t h w e s t e r n 
I n s t i t u t e , used the formula to come up with 
the format for i t . 
Q Is t h a t the way t h a t you've been t r a i n e d 
t o d e t e r m i n e c r i t i c a l speed scuffs from the 
formula? 
A Yes. 
THE COURT: Do you not use charts? 
THE WITNESS: I do use the charts. That 
specific night and the next day during my 
investigation, yes, I did use the icharts. 
Q (By Mr. Andrus) So, you didn't work 
through the formula. You just took it from 
the charts. 
A I took it from the charts. 
The Court then overruled the objection and allowed 
Officer Erickson to testify concerning the alleged speed of 71 
miles per hour of the- vehicle being driven by Mr. Wight. 
Officer Dahle testified that he had 19 years of 
experience and had attended similar coursep as Officer Erickson 
as well as other training (T. 246). Officer Dahle never visited 
the accident scene as did Officer Erickson and he never made 
the crucial measurements; and, based upon assumptions made by 
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Officer Erickson, he testified that the speed would have been 
71 miles per hour (T. 249). 
On cross-examination, he testified that Trooper 
Erickson in his original notes had used a figure of seven and 
one-half feet instead of seven and one-half inches (T. 252). 
Using that measurement, Officer Dahle testified the speed of 
defendant's car would have been 21 miles per hour. 
In this case, Officer Erickson did not have sufficient 
expertise to determine speed by reconstruction of a collision 
where the vehicles collided head on. The Court erred in allowing 
the evidence to be received without sufficient foundation and 
based upon hearsay which was never introduced at trial. 
Bischoft v. Koenig, 100 N.W.2d 159 (North Dakota, 1960), 66 
A.L.R.2d 1048 to 1075; and Ward v. Brown, 301 F.2d 445 (10th 
Cir., 1962). The reconstruction of speed from vehicles involved 
in a collision requires specified scientific and technical 
knowledge. Utah Rules of Evidence 702. The witness in this 
case did not have sufficient training and did not have sufficient 
experience. 
The officer was also allowed to give his opinion as 
to the location of the point of impact between the vehicles. 
His opinion in this regard is subject to the same foundational 
problems. (See, for example, cross-examination at pages 235 
and 242.) The officer indicated that the majority of the debris 
was found in the defendant's lane, fact inconsistent with his 
conclusions (T. 242). (Compare testimony of Trooper Slagowski 
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who testified that the mid-ordinant was about seven inches (T. 
276) .) 
The Courts have been very cautious in requiring 
sufficient foundation and expertise in relation to critical 
evidence on speed by reconstruction. 
in Clark v. Cotten, 573 SW.2d 886 (Tex.App., 1978), 
the trial court properly excluded the testimony of an officer 
investigating a head-on collision caused by a pick-up truck 
driving faster than conditions would permit. His testimony was 
excluded even though the trooper had been with the department 
of public safety for eight and one-half years, had received 17 
weeks of training, and had investigated 350 accidents. The 
officer testified he saw "eraser marks" on the highway indicating 
defendant's westbound vehicle went into a skid or hydroplaned 
after hitting a puddle of water, went into the eastbound lane, 
and struck the plaintiff's vehicle; and the officer's training 
was that car could hydroplane at 56 mph when traveling through 
water. The investigating officer's opinion as to speed of 
defendant's automobile was properly excluded, where it would 
have been based, at least in part, on damage to the respective 
vehicles after the moment of impact. Further, there was an 
insufficient showing as to the witness' qualification to render 
such an opinion. See Baldwin v. Schipper, 393 F.2d 363 (Colo., 
1968). An officers opinion has no probative value on speed, 
when based solely on damage resulting from a collision, absent 
skid marks, and showing of his qualifications as an expert to 
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determine speed, and his opinion is not admissible. See Reaves 
v. Brooks, 430 SW.2d 926 (Tex.Cir.App., 1971). 
In B^i^e^_v^_Rtiodes , 276 P.2d 713 (Ore. 1954), an 
action under the Oregon guest statute for injuries sustained 
when the automobile owned and operated by the defendant went 
off the road and plunged down an embankment, the court reversed 
a judgment for the plaintiff and ordered a new trial. The court 
held that prejudicial error was comitted in permitting a state 
police officer to give opinion testimony as to the speed of the 
defendant's automobile when his opinion was based on physical 
facts which he observed when investigating the accident. The 
court said that when the matter of speed is involved, the 
question primarily is not how fast the automobile was traveling 
in specific miles per hour, but whether its speed, whatever it 
may have been in miles per hour, was excessive under all the 
facts, circumstances, and conditions existing at the time. The 
court added that competent and qualified eyewitnesses who have 
observed a motor vehicle in motion may give their eyewitnesses 
who have observed a motor vehicle in motion may give their 
opinion as to the rate of speed it was traveling, but one not 
an eyewitness cannot express an opinion based solely upon 
physical facts existing after an accident, as to the rate of 
speed prior to the accident. 
In R£Ji!om_v^_W££ih.£££ / 370 W.2d 598 (Ark., 1963), 
an action for injuries sustained by a pedestrian struck by the 
defendant's automobile, the court reversed a judgment for the 
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defendant on the grounds that it was error to admit the testimony 
of a police officer. The police officer testified as to the 
speed of the defendant's automobile when he had not witnessed 
the speed of the car or seen the scene of the accident or the 
skid marks, he had not inspected the brakes of the car, did not 
know the condition of the tread of the tires and did not know 
the extent to which the tires were inflated, did not know the 
number of passengers in the car as it affected the weight of 
the vehicle, and had conducted tests for skid factors at a place 
other than the scene of the accident, with a different car, on 
the morning of the trial. The court concluded that there were 
too many unknown factors which, according to the testimony of 
the witness himself, influenced the accident and the results 
should be considered by an expert before opinion testimony as 
to speed based on skid marks should be admitted. 
In this case, there was not sufficient evidence of 
expertise or foundation to admit the critical evidence which 
is the primary basis for evidence of negligence. 
V 
THE RECORD OF THE T R I A L AND THE P O S T -
CONVICTION HEARING HELD IN WIGHT V. COOK 
SUPPORTS A FINDING OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL WHICH REQUIRES A NEW TRIAL. 
I n S t a t e v . M a l m r o s e , t h e Supreme C o u r t s t a t e d : 
D e f e n d a n t r e l i e s u p o n t h e U . S . v . B o s c h , 
5 8 4 F . 2 d 1 1 1 3 ( 1 s t C i r . , 1 9 7 8 ) , s t a n d a r d 
o f " r e a s o n a b l y c o m p e t e n t a s s i s t a n c e o f 
c o u n s e l " . T h e C o u r t i n J22££_XjL_iLLiiLE ' 
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613 F.2d 275 (10th C i r . , 1980), i n t e r p r e t e d 
t he s t a n d a r d t o impose a f o u r - p a r t t e s t to 
d e t e r m i n e whether t he re has been "reasonably 
competen t a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l . " The t e s t 
r e q u i r e s the defendant to (1) e s t a b l i s h proof 
of the i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s of counse l , (2) show 
t h a t t h e i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s was due to t he 
i n a d e q u a c y of c o u n s e l and not as a r e s u l t 
of t r i a l s t r a t e g y , (3) d e m o n s t r a t e t h a t 
b e t t e r r e p r e s e n t a t i o n might have had some 
e f f e c t upon t h e r e s u l t of t he t r i a l , and 
(4) prove t h a t mot ions and ob j ec t i ons which 
were n o t made would not have been f u t i l e 
i f r a i s e d . The s t a n d a r d in Dyer has not 
been express ly adopted in Utah. 
However , t h e r e a r e Utah c a s e s which 
when read t o g e t h e r p a r a l l e l t h a t s t a n d a r d . 
In S t a t e v . Gray, Utah 601 P.2d 918 (1979) , 
we h e l d t h a t t h e a c c u s e d h a s a r i g h t t o 
e f f e c t i v e counsel who does more than s a t i s f y 
a p r e t e n s e of r e p r e s e n t a t i o n . We s t a t e d 
t h a t t h e d e f e n d a n t b e a r s t h e b u r d e n of 
e s t a b l i s h i n g i n e f f e c t i v e n e s s . The proof 
must be d e m o n s t r a b l e , not s p e c u l a t i v e . In 
^ ^ £ i £ - l ^ „ l l £ l ! i £ 2 l 2 i ' U t a h , 554 P .2d 20 3 , 
205 (1976) / we s t a t e d t h a t t he c o u r t s w i l l 
n o t s e c o n d g u e s s " l e g i t i m a t e e x e r c i s e of 
judgment as t o t r i a l t a c t i c s or s t r a t e g y . " 
O t h e r Utah c a s e s have held t h a t t h e r e i s 
no p r e j u d i c i a l e r r o r w a r r a n t i n g r e v e r s a l 
of t h e c o n v i c t i o n u n l e s s b e t t e r r e p r e s e n -
t a t i o n i s l i k e l y to have produced a d i f f e r e n t 
r e s u l t . _S t. a. J: e_ v^_ G£ ci j£ , s u p r a ; S t a t e v . 
l £ E £ 2 i ] i ' U t a h , 560 P . 2d 337 ( 1 9 7 7 ) ; J a r a -
EiAi£_Z-L_!£££££ ' 2 4 Utah 2d 19 , 46 5 P . 2d 
3 4 3 (19 7 0 ) ; /U 1. j .£ £ j3 _v^_T £ £ n £ £ , 22 Utah 
2d 1 1 8 , 449 P .2d 241 ( 1 9 6 9 ) . In H e i n l i n 
X ^ _ £ l l £ J l ' U t a h , 542 P . 2d 1081 ( 1 9 7 5 ) , we 
h e l d t h a t t h e f a i l u r e of c o u n s e l t o make 
mot ions or o b j e c t i o n s which would be f u t i l e 
i f r a i s e d does not c o n s t i t u t e i n e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e . In o r d e r to show i n e f f e c t i v e 
a s s i s t a n c e of c o u n s e l in t h i s c a s e , t h e r e -
f o r e , de fendan t must show t h a t the s t andards 
we have enumerated in p r e v i o u s c a s e s were 
not s a t i s f i e d . 
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In this case the defendant believes that his claim 
of ineffective assistance of counsel can be based upon objective 
points during the trial as set forth herein. The principal area 
of concern of the defendant is the lack of objections. In State 
v. Malmrose, the Court stated: | 
Rule 4, Utah Rules of Evidence, requires 
a clear and definite objection to evidence 
at trial before appellate review can be 
requested. Stagmeyer v. Leatham Brothers, 
inc., 20 Utah 2d 421, 439 P.2d 279 (1969); 
WMiJLJLi-.E 1EE.1H' 10 utah 2d 62' 348 p-2d 
343 (1960). The assignments of error where 
no objection was made at trial, therefore, 
are considered only to the extent that they 
may bear upon the claim of incompetence of 
counsel. 
The defendant would cite to Point II of this brief 
in support of the failure to make an objection as one significant 
area of a lack of objection that supports a finding of ineffec-
tive assistance of counsel. 
A second example is the evidence concerning the 
admission of the exhibits containing blood and results of testing 
on the blood as set forth in Point III of this brief. In 
addition, the record contains other information not objected 
to by counsel as set forth in the motion for new trial. 
The defendant-appellant asks the court to review the 
other specific instances which he claims support his contention 
on appeal concerning effective assistance of counsel: 
1. Page 9 of the transcript concerning the 
preparation for trial. 
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2. In allowing the expert medical examiner to testify 
as to facts not in evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
On the basis of the preceding points, the Court should 
reverse the conviction and order that a new trial not be afforded 
to the defendant-appellant. ^ ^ V -
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